By,
Mark E.P. Monaghan
Lieutenant-Commander, U.S. Navy
Companion, Naval Order of the United States

    Immediately following the signal United States naval victory at Santiago in July, 1898, the press began circulating stories that the admiral in command at Santiago, Admiral William T. Sampson, had not given his subordinate, Commodore Schley due credit for the victory.  Commodore Schley and his ships from the Flying Squadron had been responsible for the quick destruction of the Spanish Squadron under Admiral Cervera off Santiago.

    The same press that brought the plight of the Cuban rebels to the attention of America, began to extol the virtues and omissions of one or the other, bringing on a seemingly never-ending controversy about who won the victory at Santiago.  Representative Berry of New Jersey took up the cause for Commodore Schley.  To us today, it would seem obvious that if Admiral Sampson were in overall command, he and all of the men under his command would receive the praise.  Although this is generally what happened, it seemed to supporters of Commodore Schley that this was a purposeful effort to undermine the Commodore's principal role in the victory.  It might seem somewhat trivial today, but during the turn of the century, honor and what one said and didn't say, carried great weight; and any insinuation of impropriety or hint of a dereliction of duty was not only a great insult, but usually required a courts-martial or court of inquiry to settle the matter in order to restore an officer's reputation.  There are usually found, better reasons for courts of inquiry as in the Schley case.  Americans, new on the international scene (they had just won an empire in the Caribbean and western Pacific), approached the results of the great victory, perhaps not fully understanding naval hierarchies and procedures, unlike today when the InterNet and rapid communications and information on military operations are made readily available.  The contentions and posturing brought out details of the operations in the Caribbean which tended to show Commodore Schley in a bad light.  There were many questions about how Commodore Schley prosecuted the Santiago Campaign which had been not been thoroughly delved into due to the ultimate success of the mission.

    The first of the main points of the contention arose over the conduct of the search for the Spanish Squadron.  His abandonment of the search in order to re-coal his ships at Key West almost caused the Americans to miss the Spanish ships in Santiago.  Admiral Sampson, as well as Secretary of the Navy Long, considered Commodore Schley's conduct during the search for Cervera before the battle as "reprehensible".   Later, while the blockade of Santiago was in effect, there was some contention that Commodore Schley quit an attempt to shell the Spanish cruiser CRISTOBAL COLON due to the heavy fire from the shore batteries.  Then, during the Battle of Santiago, issues arose over the signal sent from Admiral Sampson's flagship "report your casualties", as he passed each ship in turn up to Commodore Schely's cruiser, the USS BROOKLYN, which was seen as a blunt numbing of the victorious feelings of the crew.   Additionally, Secretary Long with the support of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt had caused Schley to be promoted over the heads of dozens of seniors to take command of the Flying Squadron, earning him the jealousy of many officers and Navy Department officials. Finally, a near collision during the naval battle between the USS BROOKLYN and the USS TEXAS was viewed as sloppy seamanship on Commodore Schley's part.

    Sampson, on his part, earned the disdain of General Shafter, U.S. Army, as well as the bevy of news reporters outside Santiago when he refused to risk his ships in a possible minefield to engage the Spanish cruisers inside Santiago harbor, which would hasten the city's surrender and greatly lessen the need for an attack by the U.S. Army.

    As far as who was in overall command, it was Rear Admiral Sampson, Commander of the North Atlantic Squadron.  Commodore Schley, Commander of the Flying Squadron, was placed under the command of Admiral Sampson by Secretary Long to search for Spanish Admiral Cervera.  Commodore Schley, however, was the officer commanding the western sector of the blockade; and was, with the captains of the other American ships, responsible for the utter destruction of the Spanish squadron.

    With the stage now set, let us review the sequence of events leading up to the destruction of the Spanish squadron at Santiago.  An important point that the reader must be aware of, is that coaling was a major problem in 1898.  America at that time possessed no overseas bases, had few colliers (coal carrying cargo ships like today's oilers).  The coal-burning ships of the turn of the century were inefficient and had a short range of steaming.  Thus, the need for adequate coal had to be carefully considered by the commander of a squadron before each action or maneuver, in order to maintain fuel enough to rendezvous with a collier or steam back to the coaling base.  Key West became such a place in the Spanish-American War, as well as the major debarkation port for U.S. troops enroute to Cuba.  Additionally, when colliers accompanied the main force, they steamed extremely slowly, and all of the ships were prone to mechanical breakdowns.  Great steel, steam ships were new to the United States.  For example, the USS MAINE had been the first all steel battleship, and had only been just launched in 1890 and completed in 1893.

    The Search for Cervera.

    Communications between ships in 1898 were conducted by hailing the next ship through a speaking trumpet when in close proximity, or by sending over written instructions or letters forwarded by a destroyer or light cruiser.  This greatly complicated the war reports being sent between the Caribbean Theater and Washington, D.C. This became an important factor in the Sampson-Schley Affair because of the assumptions made by the individuals involved, as well as the American Government and the public, to fill in the information voids.  On February 15, 1898, the USS MAINE exploded in Havana Harbor.  It was decided that she had been mined, which exploded her ammunition magazines.  On April 25, 1898, Congress declared war on Spain.  Secretary Long sent the Flying Squadron to reinforce the North Atlantic Squadron.  Admiral Sampson, then sends Schley to search for Admiral Cervera's Squadron.  Admiral Cervera had to be destroyed before it was deemed safe to land American troops in Cuba.

 North Atlantic Squadron                    Flying Squadron
 (Rear Admiral Sampson)                    (Commodore Schley)
 Battleship NEW YORK (Flagship)     Cruiser BROOKLYN (Flagship)
 Battleship INDIANA                          Battleship IOWA
 Battleship OREGON                           Battleship MASSACHUSETTS
 Cruiser NEW ORLEANS                   Battleship TEXAS
 Auxiliary Cruiser Yankee                     Cruiser MINNEAPOLIS
 Unarmored Cruiser Dolphin                 Cruiser ST. PAUL
 Destroyer GLOUCESTER                  Light Cruiser MARBLEHEAD
 Destroyer VIXEN                               Light Cruiser YALE
 Collier CASTENE                              Collier MERRIMAC

     Commodore Schley had been ordered by Admiral Sampson to patrol to the west of Cuba near Santiago, then the capitol of Spanish Cuba.  Schley, concerned about his coal stores in the hunt for Admiral Cervera's Squadron, decided that he needed to re-coal his ships in case Admiral Cervera was trying to string him along until he was low on fuel.  Since there was no radar, no satellites, no radio between the ships, the only way to conduct such a search was to send out your destroyers and light cruisers as scouts ahead of the main force, much like cavalry was used during the Civil War.  Schley abandoned his search for Cervera and headed towards the coal-base, Key West.  Word arrived shortly afterwards that the Spanish Squadron was indeed holed-up in Santiago Harbor, and Schley joined up with Sampson's main force to blockade the Spanish in port.

    The Battle of Santiago.

The Spanish Squadron
(Admiral Cervera)
Cruiser INFANTA MARIA TERESA (Flagship)
Cruiser CRISTOBAL COLON
Cruiser OQUENDO
Cruiser VIZCAYA
Destroyer PLUTON
Destroyer FUROR

    Admiral Cervera unintentionally cooperated by allowing himself to be bottled up in Santiago harbor.  The North Atlantic Squadron arrived on the scene and took up blockading stations.  An attempt was made to shell the CRISTOBAL COLON, as she was visible just inside the roadstead, but it was broken off, possibly due to the heavy fire from the shore batteries protecting the harbor entrance.  On July 3,1898 Cervera came out, single-file.  Admiral Sampson in the USS NEW YORK was caught off station, preparing to meet with General Shaftner to the east.  Commodore Schley's ships, with the USS OREGON and the American destroyers swarmed in to meet the Spaniards, who were hugging the coastline.  As the USS BROOKLYN headed for the Spanish flagship MARIA TERESA, the latter turned to port, as if to ram, USS BROOKLYN sheered off and missed hitting the USS TEXAS by a "narrow margin".  This caused the USS TEXAS to back her engines, allowing the USS BROOKLYN to pass ahead.  At this point in the chase, American gunnery began to tell on the Spanish ships.  The Americans had carefully removed all inflammable materials for battle, whereas the Spanish ships had wooden decks, awnings rigged, etc.  The Spanish ships soon were burning fiercely, and one by one beached themselves along the coast.  The CRISTOBAL COLON made her escape, but was soon overhauled by the USS OREGON and the USS BROOKLYN.  Soon, she too was beached, and then exploded.  It was at this point that the USS NEW YORK came steaming up with her signal; "report your casualties" flying, as she passed each ship in the American Squadron.

    The Schley Court of Inquiry.

    After the battle, and the victorious return of the North Atlantic Squadron to New York, the rumblings and complaining of "improper treatments" and bruised egos flared in the press and in American society.  In 1900, Admiral Sampson died, which did little to settle the matter.  Upon the petition of now Admiral Schley to Secretary of the Navy Long, a Court of Inquiry was established, with Admiral George Dewey, the Hero of the Battle of Manila Bay, as the President of the Court.  The Court met at the Navy Yard in Washington, DC, and began investigating the evidence on 12 September 1901.  The Secretary of the Navy detailed the following points to investigate with respect to Admiral Schley:

    1) Commodore Schley's conduct in the search for Admiral Cervera off Cienfuegos in May, 1898.

    2) The disobedience to Navy Department orders by Commodore Schley with respect to a dispatch alerting him to the
        presence of the Spanish Squadron in Santiago, and to move there, dated 25 May, 1898.

    3) What was the actual condition of the Flying Squadron's coal on or about 27 May 1898; coaling facilities; and the
         necessity to turn for Key West by Commodore Schley.

    4) Whether or not every effort was made to destroy the Spanish cruiser CRISTOBAL COLON as she lay at anchor within
        range of the Americans' guns; the engagement of the Spanish batteries; and Commodore Schley's conduct of the
        operation.

    5) The subsequent withdrawal of the ships under direct command of Commodore Schley from the attack on CRISTOBAL
        COLON.

    6) The position of the USS BROOKLYN on the morning of 3 July, 1898; and the circumstances and reasons for the
        maneuver which placed the USS BROOKLYN in danger of collision with the USS TEXAS while the Spanish ships were
        coming out of Santiago.

    7) The circumstances surrounding a report by Lieutenant Albon Hodges, Navigator in the USS BROOKLYN, and the
        statement that he overheard by Commodore Schley to quit the action against the CRISTOBAL COLON.

    Underlying these investigative points are serious matters relating to ineptness and disobedience of orders from his commander and the Secretary of the Navy; the abandonment of a search for a threatening enemy to re-coal without proper reason to do so; an implication of cowardice under fire during the attack on the COLON; and the endangering of two ships of the United States Government and the crews of two ships in a near-collision off Santiago.  The only reason that this wasn't a courts-martial was because it had been requested by Admiral Schley, and the Navy Department had preferred no charges against him.  Admiral Sampson, although shocked at his actions during the search for Cervera, preferred no charges because of the ultimate success of the mission to destroy the Spanish Squadron and assist in the taking of Santiago.  What lay in the outcome of the investigation was the exoneration of slanders on Admiral Schley, or a rejection of his honorable service due to his dereliction of duty while in a position of command.

    The first major piece of testimony concerned the proximity of the USS BROOKLYN and the USS TEXAS on the day of the Battle of Santiago, 4 July, 1898.  Commander Bates, the Chief Engineer of the USS TEXAS at that time stated that the USS TEXAS' engines had been placed astern for three minutes between 0940-0945.  He had been at his station in the starboard engine room.  The leading machinist in the port engine room, MM1 Claxton, confirmed that the port engine was also astern during that time.   The Commanding Officer of the USS Texas was Captain Phillips.  He stated that when the flagship (USS NEW YORK) signaled "250" for general action, the USS TEXAS headed for the escaping Spanish ships, and was soon overtaken by the USS OREGON as she forged ahead, but gave no mention of being cut-off by the USS BROOKLYN.

    On the sixth day, Rear Admiral Cotton, the former Commanding Officer of the dispatch ship USS HARVARD, reported on the occurrences of 27 May, 1898 upon arriving aboard Commodore Schley's flagship.  "Commodore Schley told me the trouble he had had in getting coal on board of any of the ships at Cienfuegos, he said he was very anxious, as to the coal supply was getting short; that the weather was bad and had been bad almost continuously; that it was a very serious problem as to how or whether he was going to be able to get coal on the ships at all off Santiago.  He said if the weather did not improve and he found it impractical to coal them, he could only see one resort, and that was that he would be compelled to return to Key West in order to supply his ships with coal."(1)   There had been, previous to this testimony, a report on the actual state of the USS TEXAS’ coal bunkers.  At Hampton Roads, before sailing for Cuban waters, Commodore Schley coaled his ships every day.  “Schley’s passion for full bunkers had grown into an obsession.  Thus during the forthcoming campaign- during the uncertain, time and fuel-consuming blindman’s bluff to locate Cervera- Schley was prone to be apprehensive about his fuel supply.”   Commodore Schley feared that Cervera’s swift cruisers would draw him out and run him out of coal.  He began to calculate for each operation, the fuel required to ensure that he could reach Key West to recoal.  The USS TEXAS and the USS MASSACHUSETTS attempted to recoal at sea with collier USS MERRIMAC, but without success.  Despite the
concerns of Commodore Schley about the coal state of the USS TEXAS, Captain Phillips of the USS TEXAS reported that his ship had been full-up or nearly so.

    The next major testimony of interest was the statement by the Commanding Officer of the USS HARVARD, and the background on the search for Cervera phase of the operation.  A dispatch sent by Commodore Schley to the Navy Department on 21 May, 1898 read as follows: “Received dispatch May 26 delivered by HARVARD off Santiago, de Cuba.  MERRIMAC’s engine is disabled and she is Helpless; am obliged to have her towed to Key West.  Have been absolutely unable to coal the TEXAS, MARBLEHEAD, VIXEN, and BROOKLYN from collier, owing to very rough seas and boisterous weather since leaving Key West.  BROOKLYN is the only one in squadron having more than sufficient coal to reach Key West. Impossible to remain off Santiago in present state of coal account of squadron.  Not possible to coal to leeward of Cape Cruz in summer owing to southwest winds.  HARVARD just reports to me she has only coal enough to reach Jamaica, and she will proceed to Port Royal; also reports only small vessels could coal at Gonaives or Mole, Haiti.  MINNEAPOLIS has only coal enough to reach Key West, and the same of YALE, which will tow MERRIMAC.
It is to be regretted that the Department’s orders can not be obeyed, earnestly as we have all striven to that end!  I am
forced to return to Key West via Yucatan passage for coal.  Can ascertain nothing certain concerning enemy.  Was obliged to send EAGLE to Port Antonio, Jamaica yesterday, as she had only 27 tons coal on board.  Will leave ST. PAUL here.  Will require 9,500 tons of coal at Key West. Schley”(2)

    Previous to this communiqué to the Department of the Navy, the Secretary of the Navy sent Commodore Schley a letter based on intelligence from the State Department, that the Spanish Fleet was in Santiago, and to proceed there at once.  This letter was received by Admiral Sampson, and immediately forwarded to Commodore Schley in the USS IOWA.  Here is the result of the slow communications efforts of the turn of the century.  It took some time for the USS IOWA to catch up with Commodore Schley and deliver the letter.

    At this point in the inquiries, the testimony of the navigation and handling of the USS BROOKLYN was reviewed during the Battle of Santiago.  Rear Admiral Evans, the former Commanding Officer of USS IOWA, ascertained that the USS BROOKLYN went across the bow of the USS TEXAS at about 100 yards.  In the cross-examination, Rear Admiral Evans stated that the charts were "imperfect to say the least and could have caused not only a miscalculation of the distance between BROOKLYN and TEXAS, but also of the range to the COLON."  This was a considerable point, because the chart was drawn, and the scale was inaccurate, as well as geographic landmarks and the plotted ships' tracks.

    Mr. James Howe, a photo-journalist for Collier's Weekly Magazine stated that he had heard hailing from Captain Sigsbee, that the Spanish were at Santiago.  Captain Charles Sigsbee, formerly the Commanding Officer of the sunken battleship USS MAINE, had been then been the Commanding Officer of the USS St. PAUL during the battle.  The defense, during cross-examination, was able to discount the witness' testimony about the dispatch concerning the Spanish Fleet being in Santiago because they (USS St. PAUL) had received the word second-hand.

    Rear Admiral Benham, then the Commanding Officer of USS St. PAUL stated on the ninth day of testimony that he had found the Spanish Fleet at Santiago on 29 May 1898.  A certain Mr. Dieuaide, a reporter for the New York Sun was then examined about his article claiming that "the victory was Schley's."  Next, Lieutenant-Commander Sharp, former Commanding Officer of the USS VIXEN was called.  He witnessed the USS BROOKLYN swerve to port, and then he saw the USS TEXAS go dead in the water.  He was present in Commodore Schley's cabin after the battle, and corrected inaccuracies that the Commodore's staff were representing about this incident.

    By the thirtieth day, it was time to hear from Rear Admiral Schley.  Rear Admiral Schley stated that on 17 May 1898, the Flying Squadron had arrived at Key West, and he received written orders from the Secretary of the Navy via the USS St. PAUL, ordering him to blockade Cuba.  Off the coast of Cuba, he met Admiral Sampson in the USS NEW YORK, who modified his orders placing him under his own command to blockade Cienfuegos, Cuba.  A rumor that Admiral Cervera was at Santiago was "not believed" by Commodore Schley.  He stated that coaling was done with great difficulty by the colliers USS DUPONT and USS CASTENE.  A ship stopped by the American blockaders, the ADULA, reported Spanish ships at Santiago.

    The next witness was Boatswain's Mate Chief Petty Officer William Hill, formerly of the USS BROOKLYN.  He stated that the USS BROOKLYN was the best coaler, but that the collier USS MERRIMAC's hoists and booms couldn't reach the USS BROOKLYN when they were alongside.  He stated that he had heard Commodore Schley order port helm during the Battle of Santiago, but that the helm was put over to starboard.  The USS TEXAS was to starboard.  "We never crossed her bow", he said.  He also stated that the USS TEXAS never backed, or stopped.

    Rear Admiral Schley then continued his testimony.  From the 24th to the 26th of May, there was a rolling swell at Cienfuegos, and that coaling ship was not possible.  War is not economical, and he stated that he had checked his ships' endurance at their high and low speeds.  He figured that the enemy would run towards their bases, and not towards the American's bases of supply, to wit, Puerto Rico or towards their friends in French Martinique.  He further stated that there was no disobedience of orders.  The Department of the Navy dispatch showed that they had wanted Commodore Schley to confirm their belief of Spanish ships in Santiago harbor.  He then stated that "the Flying Squadron never did actually reach Key West to coal; and that we did establish that the enemy was at Santiago."  The dispatch that he had sent "regretting that the Department of the Navy's orders cannot be obeyed" was simply a "bad choice of words".

    On the thirty-first day, Rear Admiral Schley discussed the blockade.  "The COLON was seen plainly”, he said, and "I dispatched to Admiral Sampson our findings."  On 1 June 1898, an attempt was made to hit the Spanish Cruiser COLON.  Commodore Schley transferred his flag to the USS MASSACHUSETTS. He stated that "upon reaching 7,000 yards distance we opened fire."  The shore batteries opened fire as well.  Rear Admiral Schley explained that, "with only five or six ships, to lose one or two and have more damaged would have invited attack- so the action was broken off."  He also stated that he never did say "let's get out of this" or words to that effect.  In response to the BROOKLYN-TEXAS incident, he stated that, "the Spanish came out, and TEXAS was abaft BROOKLYN's starboard beam."  Commodore Schley told Captain Cook, Commanding Officer of the USS BROOKLYN to "head for the enemy".  The Spanish cruiser VIZCAYA turned to ram, but then turned westward again.  At that point Captain Cook ordered "hard aport".  Rear Admiral Schley said, "the turn was very rapid- we passed ahead of TEXAS but never crossed her bow at 1,100 yards or so."

    On the thirty-third day, Rear Admiral Schley reviewed some of his previous testimony.  He stated that "if we couldn't coal off Santiago- we wouldn't be able to stay."  He stated further that he ordered his ships to leave the search and blockade station because:
    -Captain Cook of the USS BROOKLYN didn't believe that the Spanish were at Cienfuegos.
    -The Pilot Nunez also didn't believe that the Spanish ships were at Cienfuegos.
    -Admiral Sampson was minimizing the possibilities of Cienfuegos in his dispatch.
    -"The Department of the Navy authorized me to coal at Gonaives-westward."

    On day thirty-four, in response to testimony about Commodore Schley abandoning the effort to inflict injury on the Spanish cruiser COLON before the day of the battle, he stated that a cautionary telegram was received by him, which told Commodore Schley that "the Department of the Navy doesn't want his vessels to be exposed to fire from the Spanish shore batteries and suggested a rigid blockade."

    The Findings.

    On December 13, 1901, the Court delivered its' Findings of Fact.  A review of the details that had been ascertained were stated.  Then, the majority Opinion of the Court was reported:

    1) Commodore Schley should have proceeded with utmost dispatch off Cienfuegos and should have maintained a close
        blockade of that port."
    2) He should have contacted the rebels for information.
    3) He should have proceeded directly from Cienfuegos to Santiago to intercept any attempt by the Spanish to escape from
        the Flying Squadron.
    4) He should not have delayed his departure for Santiago because of the USS EAGLE.
    5) "He should not have made the retrograde turn westward with his squadron."
    6) "He should have promptly obeyed the Navy Department's order of May 25."
    7) Commodore Schley should have captured or destroyed the Spanish ships at anchor in the harbor entrance at Santiago
        29-30 May 1898.
    8) "He did not do his utmost to capture or destroy the COLON and other vessels of the enemy which he attacked on May
        31."
    9) He commenced the fire at the opening of the Battle of Santiago with his port guns, and when USS BROOKLYN was
        turned, she lost her firing position against the Spanish cruisers VIZCAYA and COLON.
    10) USS BROOKLYN's starboard turn was made to avoid placing her too close to the Spanish ships, then showing signs
          of intending to ram.
    11) This turn by BROOKLYN was made towards the USS TEXAS, causing her to stop and back her engines to avoid a
           collision.
    12) Commodore Schley did an injustice to his subordinate, Lieutenant Hodgson in only publishing a portion of that officer's
           correspondence.
    13) "Commodore Schley's conduct on connection with the events of the Santiago campaign prior to 1 June, 1898, was
            characterized by vacillation, dilatoriness, and lack of enterprise."
    14) Commodore Schley's reports on his coal supply and coaling capabilities were "inaccurate and misleading".
    15) "His conduct during the battle of July 3 was self-possessed, and he encouraged, in his own person, his subordinate
           officers and men to fight courageously."

    Admiral George Dewey, the President of the Court, attached a letter from himself and the Navy Judge-Advocate General, Sam Lemly, both representing the minority opinion.  It stated that they believed that Commodore Schley had indeed proceeded correctly from Cienfuegos, and that he had been correct in his worries about the coaling of his ships.  They also believed that his blockade of Cienfuegos and then Santiago were both effective.  They then stated that he was the senior officer during the battle, and was entitled to the whole credit for the victory.

    The recommendation of the Court followed, which simply stated that "in view of the length of time which has elapsed since the occurrence of the events of the Santiago campaign, the Court recommends no further proceedings be had in the premises."

    Rear Admiral Schley was incensed.  He and his lawyers wrote an appeal to the Secretary of the Navy stating that the Court had ignored and not fully investigated the testimonies, and left the findings and opinions ambiguous.  He stated that he could prove that the findings of the Court were based on irregularities, and that the opinion of the majority be withheld until he could show evidence and review of testimony to disprove it altogether.

    Mr. E. Theall, representing the late-Admiral Sampson stated the following in relation to the findings and Rear Admiral Schley's appeal in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy.  He stated that no where was any evidence brought that discussed or attributed command to anyone other than Admiral Sampson, and that the Court had overruled testimony as to who was in command.  He believed that the minority opinion expressed by Admiral Dewey is contradictory of Admiral Dewey's own statements during the inquiry.  Admiral Sampson had been assured before his death, that the question of who was in command would not be raised.

    Secretary Long, the Secretary of the Navy, approved the opinion of the Court on 20 December, 1901.  He also stated that the statement of "no opinion" was appropriate in the question of who was in command, as evidence was not expressed or invited to this point.

    In a reply to further appeals, President Theodore Roosevelt stated that no one solely deserves the credit for the victory, "it was a captain's battle", fought by the individuals in command of their own units.

    Thus was the end of some forty days of testimony and evidence.  The opinion of the Court seemed terribly adverse for Rear Admiral Schley, and did nothing to quell the controversy, and only tended to intensify his zeal in redeeming himself against the damning words of the Court.  So it has been brought down to this very day.  In reading the testimony, it seems that the majority of the Court certainly believed that Commodore Schley was indecisive and made many tactical errors in the search and blockade phase of the campaign.  However, it can also be said that the communications of the day were not up to the task of apprising a commander in the field of a tactical situation from Washington, D.C.  There was no radar, no rapid communications, not even a wireless telegraph for ships.  It is therefore extremely difficult to judge a commander, worried about his coal supply and the imminent threat of an enemy  that was repeatedly reported but never actually sighted.  Commodore Schley certainly could have pressed his attack on the COLON, but even if not so advised, it was sensible not to risk damage to his ships unless an all-out effort was to be made to destroy the Spanish ships by running the guns as Admiral Farragut did in the American Civil War.  During the battle, it seemed strange that although Commodore Schley ordered his blockaders to ‘follow the flag”, there wasn’t any plan of action or orders for setting up a squadron or divisional assault on the fleeing Spanish ships.  It was literally a “free-for-all” of individual ships pressing their own attacks on the Spanish.  There was a lot of discrepancies among the witnesses about the state of the weather off of Cienfuegos, and whether or not coaling could be accomplished.  Of the almost-collision of the BROOKLYN and TEXAS, it seems that a lot of that confusion could have been avoided had Commodore Schley had a plan of action in case of a Spanish break-out, and stationed his ships in a fighting formation when it did happen.

    These were the main points of the investigation, and the fact that Rear Admiral Schley came out for the worse in the majority opinion of the Court, the “no further action” recommendation seemed the appropriate response.  Certainly, timely action to refer charges or provide a written censure would have been understandable, but the Court did not want to lessen the great victory at Santiago further by cutting down the man who, with the late Admiral Sampson, represented the Navy’s success which had greatly affected the Navy’s future growth and expansion.  It is important for us today, to understand the difficulties faced by the new American Navy in 1898, and how isolated the commanders were due to the lengthy time required for any communications.  It is equally important to identify the mistakes made during this campaign, and despite all of these, made by numerous persons, of the ultimate victory of the United States Navy over the declining-Empire of Spain.

Bibliography

1) West, Richard S.  Admirals of America’s Empire.  Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill Co., 1948.

2) Honan, William H.  Fire When Ready Gridley! Great Naval Stories from Manila Bay to Vietnam.  New York: St. martin’s Press, 1993.

3) United States Government Printing Office.  Record of Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry in the Case of Rear Admiral Winfield S. Schley, U.S. Navy, Vol I and II at the Washington Navy Yard 12 September 1901.  Washington: USGPO 1902.